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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
ST A TE OF GEORGIA 
BH HASID LLC, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, 
V. 
ARYEH KIEFFER, ADDISON CAPITAL 
LLC, and ADDISON ADVISORS LLC, 
Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs, 
V. 
HASID HOLDINGS, LLC and 
RONI A VRAHAM 
Counterclaim-Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2017CV298598 
Bus. Case Div. 1 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS 
The above styled matter is before this Court on various pending motions, to wit: 
(1) Plaintiffs Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery; (2) Plaintiffs Motion to 
Disqualify Jon David Huffman and Defendants' cross-Motion for Attorney's Fees; 
(3) Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoena; and (4) Plaintiffs Motion to Quash Notice to 
Produce. Having considered the record, the Court finds as follows: 
(1) Plaintiff's Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery 
Plaintiff filed the instant motion contemporaneously with its Verified Complaint prior to 
the transfer of the action to this Court. Insofar as discovery proceeded in this matter shortly after 
the transfer, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's motion as MOOT. 
(2) Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Jon David Huffman and Defendants' cross-Motion 
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for Attorney's Fees 
In its Motion to Disqualify, Plaintiff BH Hasid, LLC initially moved the Court to 
disqualify Jon David Huffman as counsel for Defendants, citing (a) a conflict of interest arising 
from Mr. Huffman having allegedly previously represented Plaintiff with regard to certain 
special purpose entities that are the subject of this action, and (b) the fact that Mr. Huffman is a 
material witness. In response, Mr. Huffman denies that he had ever represented Plaintiff and 
denies that he is a material witness to any of the facts, transactions or documents at issue in this 
litigation. Further, Defendants ask the Court for an award of their attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. 
§9-15-14(a) and (b) for having to respond to the motion. 
In subsequent briefing, Plaintiff "with[drew] without prejudice its Motion to Disqualify 
Mr. Huffman based upon the allegations that Mr. Huffman held himself out as counsel for 
Plaintiff' but continues "to object to Mr. Huffman's representation of Defendants at trial" and 
continues to seek disqualification of Mr. Huffman as trial counsel "to the extent that he is 
deemed to be a material witness in this matter."! 
Pursuant to Georgia's Rules of Professional Conduct: 
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be 
a necessary witness except where: 
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered 
in the case; or 
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the 
client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's 
firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 
or Rule 1.9. 
Ga. R. Prof. Cond. 3.7. Importantly, "[t]he party moving for disqualification of a lawyer under 
Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion to Disqualify Jon David Huffman and Opposition to Cross-Motion 
for Attorney's Fees, p. 2. 
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Rule 3.7 has the burden of showing that the lawyer "is likely to be a necessary witness" by 
demonstrating that the lawyer's testimony is relevant to disputed, material questions of fact and 
that there is no other evidence available to prove those facts." Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App. 
129, 132, 616 S.E.2d 888, 891-92 (2005). See also Lewis v. State, 312 Ga. App. 275, 283, 718 
S.E.2d 112, 118 (2011) (quoting Bernacchi v. Forcucci, 279 Ga. 460,462,614 S.E.2d 775, 778 
(2005)) ("Because of the right involved and the hardships brought about [by its deprivation], 
disqualification of chosen counsel should be seen as an extraordinary remedy and should be 
granted sparingly"). 
Here, the Court finds Plaintiff has not met its burden of establishing that disqualification 
1s warranted under Rule 3.7. Specifically, although Mr. Huffman may have had some 
involvement in transactions and events leading up to this litigation and Plaintiff asserts he 
"potentially" was involved in "the drafting and alleged execution of disputed operating 
agreements at issue", no showing has been made that Mr. Huffman's testimony "is relevant to 
disputed, material questions of fact and that there is no other evidence available to prove those 
facts." Clough, 274 Ga. App. at 132. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify is DENIED at 
this time. 
With respect to Defendants' cross-Motion for Attorney's Fees, O.C.G.A. §9-15-14 
provides in part: 
(a) In any civil action in any court of record of this state, reasonable and 
necessary attorney's fees and expenses of litigation shall be awarded to 
any party against whom another party has asserted a claim, defense, or 
other position with respect to which there existed such a complete absence 
of any justiciable issue of law or fact that it could not be reasonably 
believed that a court would accept the asserted claim, defense, or other 
position ... 
(b) The court may assess reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and 
expenses of litigation in any civil action in any court of record if, upon the 
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motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party 
brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial 
justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was interposed for delay 
or harassment, or if it finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily 
expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct, including, but not 
limited to, abuses of discovery procedures available under Chapter 11 of 
this title, the "Georgia Civil Practice Act." As used in this Code section, 
"lacked substantial justification" means substantially frivolous, 
substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious. 
Here, in light of Defense counsel's involvement in the events leading up to this litigation 
and with the entities holding properties that are the subject of this action, the Court finds 
Plaintiffs motion presented at least justiciable issues such that an award under O.C.G.A. §9-l 5- 
14(a) or (b) is not warranted. Thus, Defendants' cross-Motion for Attorney's Fees is DENIED. 
(3) Defendants' Motion to Quash Subpoena 
O.C.G.A. §24-13-23 provides: 
(a) A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to 
produce the evidence designated therein. 
(b) The court, upon written motion made promptly and in any event at or 
before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may: 
(1) Quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive; or 
(2) Condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in 
whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing 
the evidence. 
As noted by the Georgia Court of Appeals, 
[t]his standard "is tested by the peculiar facts arising from the subpoena 
itself and other proper sources. [Cits.]" Aycock v. Household Fin. 
C01p., 142 Ga.App. 207, 210(3)(b), 235 S.E.2d 578 (1977). "[N]o court 
should impose upon the opposite party the onerous task of producing great 
quantities of records which have no relevancy. The notice should be 
specific enough in its demands to relate the documents sought to the 
questions at issue." Horton v. Huiet, 113 Ga.App. 166, 169(1), 147 S.E.2d 
669 (1966). 
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Washburn v. Sardi's Restaurants, 191 Ga. App. 307, 310, 381 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1989). "(T]he 
party moving to quash has the burden of showing that the subpoena is unreasonable and 
oppressive." Bazemore v. State, 244 Ga. App. 460,463, 535 S.E.2d 830, 834 (2000). 
In the instant motion Defendants Aryeh Kieffer, Addison Capital, LLC and Addison 
Advisors, Inc. (collectively "Addison Defendants") move to quash two subpoenas ("Subpoenas") 
served by Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendants on Bank of America ("BOA") requesting the 
financial information of 16 entities and Defendant Aryeh Kieffer, personally. The Subpoenas 
request "all documents pertainin g to open or closed checking, savings, trust, or other deposit or 
checking accounts held in the name of, for the benefit of, or under the control of [the entities and 
Mr. Kieffer, respectively] from January 1, 2012 to present.t" Defendants do not oppose the 
Subpoenas to the extent they seek the financial information of the entities that own the properties 
at issue in this action ( collectively the "Subsidiaries'Y but ask the Court to quash the Subpoenas 
as to all other non-parties and as to the Addison Defendants "because the [S]ubpoenas seek pre- 
judgment disclosure of their personal financial affairs." 
Having considered the record and the allegations giving rise to Plaintiffs claims, the 
Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion to Quash the Subpoenas served upon the Subsidiaries 
and upon each of the Addison Defendants. In its Verified Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants 
mismanaged BH Hasid, the Subsidiaries, and the subject properties and that they have failed to 
account for funds in excess of $20 million. Particularly given the accounting discrepancies 
discussed during the April 11-12, 20 I 8 hearing in this matter, the Court finds the bank 
documents requested are directly relevant to the claims and matters at issue in this litigation. 
The Subpoenas also seek the financial documents of other non-parties who do not appear 
The Subpoenas were not filed with the instant motion. 
The Managed Entities include BH Winston Manor, LLC, BH Chamblee, LLC, Addison Hasid IV, LLC, 
AdcLison Hasid V, LLC and Addison Hasid VI, LLC. 
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to have any involvement in this action, including: IA Daron Village, LLC; IA One Manager, 
LLC; FNBA Services, LLC; Addison AGI I, LLC; IA One Investors, LLC; IA Two Manager, 
LLC; Mount Vernon, LLC; and IA Two Investors, LLC (collectively the "IA Parties"). Although 
the IA Parties appear to be entities with which Defendant Kiefer is involved, given the sensitive, 
financial information sought and that no showing has been made that the IA Parties have any 
involvement or dealings with Plaintiff or the Subsidiaries, Defendants' Motion to Quash is 
GRANTED at this time with respect to the Subpoenas served upon the IA Parties. If discovery 
reveals that assets of Plaintiff or the Subsidiaries have been commin gled with those of the IA 
Parties, Plaintiff may seek reconsideration of this ruling, See Blake v. Spears, 254 Ga. App. 21, 
23, 561 S.E.2d 173, 176 (2002) (subpoena requiring the defendant produce banking records from 
two other businesses he owned not unreasonable because the record reflected that assets of those 
business may have been commingled with that of business purchased by the plaintiff and the 
requested records were relevant to determine the extent of the comingling). 
(4) Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Notice to Produce 
Here, Plaintiff asks the Court to quash a Notice to Produce served upon it seeking "any 
and all records, documents, and financial or bank statements" relating to BH Hasid's ability to 
fund the Subsidiaries.4 In this action, Defendants generally aJlege the Subsidiaries were under- 
capitalized because, although Plaintiff repeatedly asserted it bad the requisite financial resources, 
it failed to sufficiently capitalize the Subsidiaries so as to properly renovate and maintain the 
subject properties. Defendants have asserted various counterclaims against Plaintiff BH Hasid 
and others, including claims for breach of :fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence 
citing, inter alia, the under-capitalization of the Subsidiaries and the allegedly improper 
withdrawal of funds in November 2017 by Roni A vraham on behalf of BH Hasid. 
The Notice to Produce was not filed with the instant motion. 
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Given the foregoing, the Court finds Defendants may obtain standard financial 
documents of BH Hasid, including financial statements to the extent available, as well as bank 
records, but their request for "any and all records, documents, and financial or bank statements" 
relating to BH Hasid's ability to fund the Subsidiaries is unreasonably broad and oppressive. 
Further, to the extent Defendants ultimately seek information regarding the personal financial 
wealth of BH Hasid's owners, given they are non-parties and in light of the privacy concerns 
with requiring nonparties to disclose their personal financial information, the Court finds 
Defendants' desire to "substantiate" Plaintiffs assertion that it has access to sufficient capital to 
fund the renovations of the Subsidiaries insufficient to justify the requested discovery. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Quash is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED fN PART, as 
limited above. 
SO ORDERED this ~~y of May, 2018. 
GOGER on behalf of 
ER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Served upon registered service contacts through eFileGA 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attornevs for Defendants 
T. Brandon Welch Jon David W. Huffman 
Enan Stillman Scott B. McMahan 
STILLMAN WELCH, LLC POOLE HUFFMAN, LLC 
3453 Pierce Drive, Suite 150 315 W. Ponce de Leon Ave., Suite 344 
Chamblee, GA 30341 Decatur, GA 30030 
Tel: (404) 907-1819 Tel: (404) 373-4008 
Brandon@stillmanwelch.com Fax: (888) 709-5723 
enan@stillmanwelch.com jondavid@goolehuffman.com 
scott@goolehuffman.com 
Steven E. Brust* 
SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL, LLP 
50 North Laura Street 
Suite 2600 
Jacksonville, Florida 32202 
Tel: (904) 598-6107 
Fax: (904) 598-6207 
sbrust@sgrlaw.com 
* Admitted pro hac vice 
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